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ABSTRACT 
The present study is a work of contemporary history. It describes and 
analyzes the personalities, events, and broader social and political trends that 
have helped to reconcile Poland’s interests in Europe with its desire to retain the 
close friendship of the United States. It considers Poland’s role in European and 
World affairs between 1979 and 2007, with a special focus on political events 
that have taken place between 2003 and 2007. In both of these periods, Poland 
was a driving force behind changes occurring in Europe. From 1979-1989 
Poland’s aspirations to independence were a signal for other Eastern European 
nations to begin a similar process. For the next fourteen years, Poland conducted 
a strongly pro-American and pro-Western policy. Thanks to correspondingly 
strong support from the United States, Poland became a NATO member and a 
strong, democratic European state. Subsequent events , including the decision to 
send Polish troops to Iraq and to accept some parts of America’s missile-defense 
shield in Poland, have been viewed negatively by some European NATO states. 
The result has been a gradual change in Poland’s attitude towards the 
CFSP/ESDP, and increasingly active Polish participation in European policies.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Purpose 
The present study analyzes Poland’s history between 1979 and 2007, with 
a special focus on political events that have taken place between 2003 and 2007. 
This thesis will answer the following question: taking into consideration the 
tension between Poland’s interests in Europe, versus its desire to retain the close 
friendship of the United States, how can Poland best manage these competing 
interests in the future, given the present international system and its challenges? 
2. Significance 
The work at hand analyzes events that took place from 1979 to 2007. 
During this time, Poland was an important driving force behind changes occurring 
in Europe. From 1979-1989, Poland’s aspirations to independence were a signal 
for other Eastern European nations to begin a similar process. The process of 
changes initiated by Poland significantly contributed to the fall of Communism in 
Europe, and in the USSR itself. 
For the next fourteen years, Poland, on the one hand, conducted a 
strongly pro-Western policy, and, on the other hand, a policy whose main aim 
was the reduction of tensions with Poland’s eastern neighbors. During this 
period, the Polish state was strongly supported by the United States of America. 
The considerable support from the U.S. eventually enabled Poland to become a 
NATO member and a strong, significant, democratic European state. 
Subsequent events (sending Polish troops to Iraq and the idea of hosting 
some parts of America’s missile-defense shield in Poland) have suggested that 
Poland continues to put good relations with the U.S. first, even before relations  
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with its other NATO allies and European neighbors. Such a trend in Poland’s 
foreign and security policies have been viewed negatively by some groups of 
people in Europe and in the world. 
As a member of NATO and the EU, Poland is now looking for a solution 
that would both strengthen (or at least retain) its position in Europe, and allow for 
close cooperation with U.S. It is an extremely difficult task, bearing in mind that in 
many cases EU and U.S. interests are divergent, and that Poland almost 
unconditionally backs all U.S. initiatives. 
There is little dispute nowadays that Poland, although an active member 
of NATO and the EU, should also conduct an active Ostpolitik 1 oriented toward 
the states of the former Soviet Union. Overall, however, Poland’s policy toward 
the United States of America is currently dominated by two issues: the war in Iraq 
and the proposed American anti-missile shield. These problems are the central 
focus of this thesis. 
B. ARGUMENT 
The post-Communist Polish foreign policy has been dominated by the 
need to balance Polish interest in good bilateral relations with the U.S., and its 
interest in being part of an increasingly integrated European community. In order 
to understand the trends in Poland’s foreign policy, it is necessary to know what 
role Poland played in the international arena from 1979 to 2003. 
Poland experienced a number of significant changes between 1979 and 
2003. It transformed from a communist, totalitarian state into a democratic state, 
and became a new, important “player” on the European continent and in the 
world. In order to achieve this goal the Poles in most cases supported by the 
third states, put a lot of effort into strengthening their homeland. 
                                            
1 David H Dunn, “Poland: America’s New Model Ally,” in Poland-A new power in Transatlantic 
Security, Marcin Zabrowski, David H. Dunn, (London: Frank Cass Publisher, 2003), 70. 
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Winston Churchill once said that there are few virtues the Poles do not 
possess and few mistakes they have not made. When it came to 
putting a peaceful end to communism, the Poles proved him wrong. 
Between 1979 (the first visit of the Polish pope to his native land) and 
1989 (the end of communism negotiated by Solidarity at a round 
table), they were the European pioneers of a new kind of non-violent 
revolution.2 
In analyzing the Polish contribution to the fall of Communism, what comes 
to the fore are Solidarity, the engine of the Polish Revolution, and two famous 
names: Lech Walesa and Karol Wojtyla. These two personalities made a great 
contribution to European politics. 
In Eastern Europe, Poland was the only place where it was possible to 
organize serious political or public opposition.3 Zbigniew Brzezinski, former 
national security adviser to President Carter, explains that “almost everything in 
Polish society and in Polish history conspired against a communist system 
imposed on Warsaw from Moscow.”4 Solidarity was a “phenomenon” which built 
up people’s hopes in Poland. 
The first success of Solidarity was in fact its own legalization, which took 
place on 31 August 1980, when Lech Walesa signed the August Agreement with 
a “plastic ballpoint pen, decorated with a photograph of the Pope.” 5 It was an 
unprecedented situation, because for the first time in the history of Poland (or 
any other Communist country), the state recognized the legitimacy of an 
organization whose ideology was different from its own. Moreover, the events of 
                                            
2 Timothy Garton Ash, “Poland has made a humiliating farce out of dealing with its red 
ghosts,” The Guardian (May 24, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree [Accessed 
October 7, 2007].  
3 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes : A History of the World,1914-1991 (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1996), 475 
4 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Fall of Communism: How Solidarity Arose,” 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3476841 [Accessed October 7, 2007]. 
5 Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution Solidarity (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 67. 
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August got a lot of publicity abroad because Solidarity became “the first 
independent trade union in the Eastern block.”6 
Unfortunately, that was a short-lived success, because in 1981, General 
Jaruzelski and the Polish military carried out a coup, the main goal being to 
destroy Solidarity. 7 In the face of an unfortunate turn of events, Solidarity had to 
go underground. “Solidarity survived, underground, despite the imposition of 
martial law and massive repression…”8 
After the end of martial law, there was a gradual process of Solidarity 
rebirth. The further course of events and ensuing circumstances (the 
deteriorating Polish economy and strikes breaking out around the country) 
resulted in re-legalization of Solidarity and the so-called “round-table” talks. 9 On 
the strength of the Round-Table Agreement in 1989, the first semi-free elections 
were held in Poland, although the country was still a member of the Communist 
Bloc. Solidarity won the elections, and its victory led to the eventual collapse of 
Communism in Poland. This significant event “initiated the fall [of] communism in 
other countries, so called snowball effect in the rest of Eastern Bloc.”10 What is 
more, the events of the 1980s in Poland “became one of the major contributing 
factors bringing about the end of Cold War.”11 
After the collapse of communism in Poland and the end of the Cold war, 
the Polish state found itself in a new political situation. Since 1989, Poland 
                                            
6 Jarosław Kurski, Lech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator? (San Francisco: Westview Press 
1993), XVII. 
7 J.F. Brown, “Poland Since Martial Law,” A Rand Note, 1998, 1. 
8 Adam Michnik, “Reflections on the Collapse of Communism,” Journal of Democracy, 11.1 
2000, 119-126. 
http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v011/11.1michnik [Accessed 
October 12, 2007]. 
9Kurski, Lech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator? XIX. 
10 Marek M Kaminski, “How communism could have been saved: Formal analysis of electoral 
bargaining in Poland in 1989,” Public Choice; Jan 1999; 98, 1-2; ABI/INFORM Global, 83, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.edu [Accessed October 13, 2007]. 
11 Marcin Zaborowski and David H Dunn, Poland-A new power in Transatlantic Security, 
Marcin Zabrowski, David H. Dunn, (London: Frank Cass Publisher, 2003), VII. 
 5
started to conduct a dual policy. Simultaneously with a pro-Western policy, 
Poland has conducted an active Ostpolitik- the reduction of tensions with 
Poland’s eastern neighbors.12 
Pursuing a pro-Western policy, Poland has concentrated its main efforts 
on accession to NATO. In order to achieve this goal, the Polish Armed Forces 
had to undergo a transformation and more importantly, Poland had to prove its 
reliability as a new, potential NATO member. Poland proved it by its military 
participation in foreign missions to the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The integration with NATO’s structures was a difficult and long-
lasting process. 
The events, which took place between 1992 and 1999, show the immense 
efforts of the Polish diplomacy to insure NATO’s inclusion of Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. Names such as Walesa, Kwasniewski, Onyszkiewicz, 
and Geremek, will go down in the history of Polish and European diplomacy. 
One might say that the Polish diplomacy was very active in the NATO 
enlargement process only because of Poland’s own security interests. Indeed, 
but its commitment to this process turned out to be a significant factor that had 
influenced the decision-making process of NATO members, and it turned out to 
be helpful for the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Before the NATO enlargement, (between 1995 and 1999), some critics of 
this process claimed that “such enlargement would cripple decision making for 
collective defense, bankrupt national treasuries with the costs of defending the 
meadows and forests of Moravia and the plains of the Hungarian Pusta, and 
needlessly provoke the Russians into a new confrontation that would resemble 
the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.”13 
                                            
12 Stephen Larrabee, “East European Security After the Cold War,” Rand National Defense 
Institute, 1993, XII. 
13 Donald Abenheim, „The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement,” 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3063166 [Accessed October 8, 2007]. 
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Those fears turned out to be unwarranted and Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary proved their reliability during the first NATO peacekeeping mission 
to Kosovo after the NATO enlargement. 
Simultaneously with the process of joining NATO, Poland started the 
process of joining the European Union. The Polish state successfully met the 
EU’s requirements, and along with Hungary and the Czech Republic, became a 
full member of the EU in 2004. 
Since1990 Poland has cooperated closely with the U.S., NATO and the 
EU. On the one hand, the United States of America significantly helped the 
Polish state to become a “new” European power, so Poland has perceived it as 
the closest ally and, to some degree, as guarantor of its security. On the other 
hand, Poland is a European state and it has sought a common ground for 
agreement with Europe. 
C. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Following the introduction, this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II 
examines Poland’s support for the U.S. in Iraq against a background of the 
transatlantic rift. It discusses Poland’s distinctive Atlanticism during the period 
when Poland, along with ten other Europen States, was a candidate to join the 
European Union. Chapter III analyses Poland’s stance on the U.S. proposal to 
deploy a ground-based midcourse defence (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile 
Defence System (BMDS) on Polish soil. It discusses Polish-Russian and Polish-
American relations in the context of BMD, as well as the stance of other NATO 
members on the American plan to deploy some elements of its anti-missile shield 
in Europe. Chapter IV analyzes the evolution of Poland’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) as well as European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). This chapter examines the factors that influenced a change in Poland’s 
views on the CFSP and ESDP. The final chapter concludes by considering the 
means and measures by which Poland might continue to play its currently 
constructive role in world and European affairs. 
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II.  POLAND IN THE IRAQ WAR 
Poland’s will in 2003 to take an active part in the “coalition of the willing” 
and all the same to support the U.S. in Iraq was very important, if not the most 
important decision made by the Polish Government since 1989. The Polish 
involvement in the Iraqi war that has been the second stage of the “Global War 
on Terrorism” (GWOT) seems to be the logical turn of events initiated after 9/11, 
when Poland supported the U.S. in Afghanistan during the first stage of the 
“GWOT.” Those two enterprises have been reflecting Poland’s solidarity with the 
U.S. and its reliability in supporting strong American unilateralism. However, 
Poland’s decision to participate in the coalition that invaded Iraq with further 
intent to occupy this country drew harsh criticism from many European countries. 
This decision might have complicated the pending process of Poland’s 
enrollment in the EU’s structures.  
Initially in 2002-2003, there was not a public debate in Poland on the 
Polish involvement in the Iraqi crisis and all major political parties agreed on 
sending the Polish troops to Iraq. However, owing to the worsening situation in 
Iraq and lack of tangible political and economic benefits for Poland, a part of the 
Polish public and some part of the political elite began to submit for discussion 
the legitimacy of the Polish troops’ involvement in Iraq. 
A. THE RATIONALE BEHIND POLAND’S DECISION TO GO TO WAR 
The Polish discussion on Iraq was characterized by a lack of details with 
reference to the Polish interests in that region. Neither did political elites in 
Poland debate on such issues, nor did these kinds of issues pervade public 
discussion. Moreover, as Marcin Zaborowski has observed, “there was not 





direct threat, there simply was no suggestion that Iraq presented a ‘clear and 
present danger.’”14 Instead, the Polish debate was predominantly dominated by 
moral and historical arguments.15 
Poland’s decision about sending Polish troops to Iraq was a result of its 
strong pro-Atlantic Foreign and Security Policy initiated by Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s 
government in 1989.16 The driving force behind the Polish decision was a desire 
to actively demonstrate Poland’s loyalty and solidarity with the U.S. and to be 
perceived as “America’s model ally.”17 Learning a lesson from the past, when in 
the interwar period the Polish State was geopolitically vulnerable, Poland has 
been eager to be in very good relations with the U.S. and to co-operate more 
closely with this country. Developing a relationship of reciprocal obligation with its 
overseas ally, Poland has counted on mutual support between these two 
countries, should the need arise. In this context, the Polish decision to support 
the United States of America in Iraq seems to be aimed at arousing a sense of 
responsibility and obligation for Poland’s security in the U.S.18 Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland wrote 
in 2003 that Poland had never abandoned its allies in need and that the support 
of the U.S. in Iraq had been an investment in Poland’s security.19 
                                            
14 Marcin Zaborowski, A lecture entitled “The European Union as a Security Actor: The 
Polish Perspective” delivered by Marcin Zaborowski at Fifth Shanghai Workshop on Global 
Governance, January 23-24, 2007 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/china/04642 [Accessed 
April 14, 2008].  
15 Marcin Zaborowski, “From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security 
policy in the twenty-first century” Occasional Paper, no 56, Institute for Security Studies 2004, 12. 
16 Adam Rotfeld, “Europe-America-Poland: Foreign Policy Dilemmas Faced by the Republic 
of Poland,” Transcript of discussion, Warsaw, 5 June 2003, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 
Vol. 4, No. 2(11), 2004, 105-106.  
17 Dunn, “Poland: America’s New Model Ally,” 63, see also Kerry Longhurst and Marcin 
Zabrowski, The New Atlanticist: Poland’s Foreign and Security Policy Priorities (London: 
Blackwell Publishing 2007), 47. 
18 Zaborowski, “From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in 
the twenty-first century,” 12. 
19 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Irak to także nasza sprawa," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Poland, http://www.msz.gov.pl/ [Accessed October 24, 2007]. 
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The second apparent reason behind Poland’s decision to participate in the 
Iraqi crisis concerned the preservation of transatlantic bonds and NATO. Again, 
because of its painful history, the Polish State did not want to be marginalized or, 
in the worst case, excluded from American foreign policy. Several years before 
the Iraqi war, the transatlantic relations had begun to deteriorate and some 
concern about the U.S. commitment to European security had emerged in 
Poland. Poland has seen the U.S.-led NATO as the guarantor of its own security, 
and that is why it would make every effort to keep Washington’s commitment to 
European security issues. Starting with the premise that supporting the U.S in 
Iraq would help to strengthen good relations with America and discourage it from 
disengaging from European security issues, Polish politicians decided to send 
troops to this Arab country.20 Mark Melamed claims that “Polish participation was 
motivated as much by loyalty to the U.S. and the desire for a robust transatlantic 
alliance as by any pressing national interest in the specific campaign in Iraq.”21 
The third set of rationales regarded moral issues such as the humanitarian 
promotion of democracy and freedom. These arguments found a voice in many 
Polish politicians’ statements. Aleksander Kwasniewski, the President of the 
Republic of Poland, during his speech at the Polish Institute of International 
Affairs in 2003 argued that Poland’s decision to send Polish troops to Iraq was 
right. ”Being convinced that international security was at stake, that this was 
about combating evil, about regaining freedom and establishing justice in lieu of 
the bloody dictatorship-Poland took part in the military action in Iraq.” 22 Another 
politician, Adam Michnik, affirms that in the moment of the attack on the World 
Trade Centre, the World faced a new, totalitarian challenge. He also states that 
violence, fanaticism and lies issued a challenge to democratic values, and that 
                                            
20 Mark Melamed, “Polish-American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq,” The 
Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2(15), 2005, 9. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Aleksander Kwasniewski, „Speech by HE Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the 
Republic of Poland, at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. The Royal Castle, Warsaw, 
June 3, 2003.” The Polish Foreign Affairs Diges, Vol. 3, No. 2(7), 2003, 11. 
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overthrowing a tyrant (Saddam Hussein) who supported the terrorism, was 
justified. Moreover, he affirmed that on the 11th of September 2001, Islamic 
fundamentalism declared war on our democratic world, the world which all of us 
have to defend. 23 In the case of Poland, the spreading of democracy acquires a 
special significance, due to its past when the Polish State was oppressed by the 
communist regime and democracy did not exist in Poland. Therefore, according 
to Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Polish Foreign Minister 
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, because of its past, Poland took responsibility for 
spreading of democracy in Iraq. At that time many Poles believed that Iraqis 
wanted to be delivered from the regime of Saddam Hussein and that an outside 
help would be welcomed. 24 
The fourth argument for supporting the U.S. in Iraq was the threat posed 
to Poland by international terrorism. Islamic terrorists proved that were able to 
strike in almost every place in the world: the U.S., the Middle East, Southeast 
Asia, etc. Therefore, some Polish politicians recognized that the acts of terror 
might affect Poland. In those circumstances, Iraq was recognized as a place 
where the larger war on global terror would be continued.25 Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 
argues that Poland took up the fight against terrorism not only because of allied 
obligations, but also because the Polish could not wait to be attacked by 
terrorism on their own land. He also declares that the strike against Saddam’s 
regime was a blow against “nationalized terrorism,” and also against the global 
structures of terrorism, which treated Iraq as “their own battleground.”26 
Moreover, Poland believed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. 
                                            
23 Adam Michnik, „My zdrajcy.” Gazeta Wyborcza, (March 29, 2003), 
http://szukaj.gazetawyborcza.pl/archiwum/1,0,2041641.html [Accessed October 24, 2007]. 
24 Zaborowski, “From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in 
the twenty-first century,”12. 
25 Ian Fisher “The Struggle for Iraq: The occupiers.” 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE1D91E3BF937A2575AC0A9659C8B63&s
ec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 [Accessed October 25, 2007]. 
26 Cimoszewicz, "Irak to także nasza sprawa."  
 11
The fifth argument was immediately linked with the desire (of President 
Kwasniewski and Leszek Miller’s government) to enhance Poland’s prestige in 
the international arena and its profile as a global actor.27 In this context, the 
Polish position needs to be understood against the background of a divided 
Europe over Iraq, and Poland’s ambitions to be involved in the EU’s decision-
making process. Taking into consideration strong French and German opposition 
to military intervention in Iraq and a rejection of a second UN resolution 
concerning Iraq, Poland found itself in a situation where France and Germany 
determined the EU foreign and security policies, while Polish influence was being 
reduced.28 Simultaneously, the Polish efforts to play a crucial role within the 
Convention on the Future of Europe were thwarted. Marcin Zaborowski claims 
that “these policy development[s] fed into the paradigm of ‘exclusion and 
inclusion’ in Polish security thinking and consequently influenced Warsaw’s 
decision to sign the ‘letter of the 8’, which was widely perceived as defying the 
Franco-German attempt to speak for the whole of the EU.”29 Moreover, he thinks 
that “rather than following the anti-war camp, Poland chose to side with what 
appeared at the time a more inclusive United States.”30 In addition, he affirms 
that “Poland, as one of the most vociferous and consistent supporters of 
American foreign policy and of solidarity between the United States and Europe, 
was likely to be among the group of states shaping the new Europe and its 
foreign policy.”31 
Another justification for Poland’s decision to take part in the war was its 
willingness to attain the potential benefits of an active supporter of the U.S. in 
                                            
27 Maria Wągrowska, “Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku.” 
Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2004, 12. 
28 Zaborowski, “From America’s protégé to constructive European: Polish security policy in 
the twenty-first century,” 13. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid. 
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Iraq.32 Moreover, Polish policy-makers had great hopes for the U.S. investments 
in Poland. In a situation where many of America’s allies were strongly opposed to 
the military intervention, the Polish policy makers recognized it as an opportunity 
to move closer to the U.S., cherishing the hope of reaping potential benefits from 
this relationship.33 The Polish expectations ranged from the access of Polish 
companies to the reconstruction process in Iraq and the participation of Polish 
armaments companies in the re-armament of the Iraqi army to the abolishing of 
visa restriction on Poles. Moreover, the Polish politicians expected that Poland 
would be recognized in the international arena as a regional power, which 
enjoyed a “special relationship” with the Bush administration.34 Adam Rotfeld, the 
then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, during one of the 
many discussions on Iraq, said that Poland’s presence “should be more 
noticeable from [the] point of view of contacts with the Iraqis. Iraq needs 
investment now, and we can invest somebody else’s funds. Having good 
relations with large companies, we can send thousands of Poles to work. There 
are many Iraqis who studied in Poland and settled here, and now we are 
cooperating with them.”35 In the Polish papers it was rumored that Poland might 
acquire the right to the exploitation of Iraqi oil and natural gas deposits.36 
B. THE DECISION IS MADE 
In 2003, when Poland sided with the U.S., the main EU players, France 
and Germany, harshly criticized its decision and some other EU countries 
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expressed concern about Poland’s decision. In 2003, Poland was among ten 
others European States as a candidate to join the European Union in 2004. A 
decision to go to war might have slowed down or permanently blocked the 
process of Poland’s integration into the EU structures because the main EU 
players, France and Germany, were strongly opposed to the war. 
1. American Unilateralism and Poland’s Distinctive Atlanticism 
The American response to the tragic events of 9/11 was the GWOT, the 
first stage beginning in Afghanistan. Preceding the war in Afghanistan, the first 
heralds of American unilateralism emerged. Despite the fact that the U.S. was 
offered the full support from the side of its NATO allies, it decided to act on its 
own.37 The American behavior, however, did not alienate Poland.  At the end of 
November 2001, when President Bush requested troops from Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, the Polish president responded positively. In January 2002, a 
contingent of 300 Polish troops was sent to Afghanistan with the aim of taking 
part in “Operation Enduring Freedom.”38 This act demonstrated Poland’s loyalty 
and solidarity with the U.S. 
The subsequent manifestation of American unilateralism was seen in 
January 2002, in President Bush’s State of the Union Address. In his speech he 
said that: 
Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in 
the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist 
camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, 
second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United 
States and the world… States like these, [North Korea, Iran, and 
Iraq] and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They 
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could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to 
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to 
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of 
indifference would be catastrophic…. America will do what is 
necessary to ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet 
time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers 
gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The 
United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous 
regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.39  
This address left little doubt that the countries of an “axis of evil” still 
threatened the U.S. In 2002, Poland still pursued its pro-American policy 
unwaveringly, which was reflected in the Polish foreign policy priorities. These 
priorities were defined in March 2002, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland 
in his exposé to the Diet of the Republic of Poland on the Main Lines of Polish 
Foreign Policy in 2002.40 
The United States National Security Strategy of September 2002 was 
consistent with President Bush’s State of the Union Address. In this document 
concerning the fight against terrorism, it was written that the U.S. would destroy 
terrorist organizations by:  
defending the United States, the American people, and our 
interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the 
threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will 
constantly strive to enlist the support of the international 
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to 
exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against 
such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people 
and our country…41 
While the U.S. strategy seriously alarmed many European states, 
Poland’s support for the American policy remained unchanging. In November 
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2002, during an interview granted by Aleksander Kwaśniewski to the German 
daily paper “Tagesspiegel”, the Polish president said that President Bush held 
distinctive views and had a constant system of values. He also said that Bush 
was not a man who ignored his allies’ opinions, and that he was not a cowboy 
fighting alone with evil. Moreover, Kwasniewski admitted that he trusted the 
American president.42 
In January 2003, when the U.S. prepared itself for the military action 
against Iraq, it tried to fully legitimize its action by urging the members of the 
United Nation Security Council (UNSC) to pass the “Second Resolution” 
concerning Iraq. At that time, however, the United States made known publicly 
that it was ready to act even without any further approval of the UNSC, arguing 
that Resolution 1441 gave it the authority to move. 43 That same month the 
Polish side showed its strong support for the leading role of the U.S. in the world 
and its policy on Iraq. On 13 January 2003, Polish president Aleksander 
Kwasniewski, during his working visit to the United States, delivered a lecture to 
the West Point Military Academy. In his speech, President Kwasniewski said that 
the U.S.’s leading role in the world could not be questioned and that “it should be 
exercised.” Moreover, he affirmed that Poland and the U.S. together could play a 
significant role in improving European and transatlantic security.44 The more 
robust view about the Iraqi issue was voiced by the Polish Foreign Minister, 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, on 23 January 2003, in his speech addressed to the 
Polish Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee. He said that Poland was ready 
to support the U.S. in the possible military action against Iraq in the extreme 
situation, also without the UN approval. He also said most emphatically that the 
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Republic of Poland kept to the UNSC resolutions, but in this special case, Poland 
did not rule out making a decision without waiting for an UNSC resolution.45 
2. Poland’s Support against a Background of the Transatlantic 
Rift  
The decision on Iraq was made by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, 
Prime Minister Leszek Miller, and Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. 
Poland’s active involvement in both consecutive stages of the Iraqi operation was 
the most controversial enterprise of Polish Foreign and Security Policy since the 
end of the Cold War. Contrary to some Polish politicians’ claims, the decisions 
concerning the participation of the Polish Armed Forces, at first in military 
intervention and then in the stabilization mission in Iraq, came relatively easily 
and swiftly.46 These decisions were made when Europe was divided into two 
camps. On the one hand there were the countries supporting the military 
operation against Iraq (among them the United Kingdom and Poland), and on the 
other hand the countries which were strongly against this idea (among others, 
France and Germany). The decision to go to war along with the U.S. was a token 
of the Polish pro-Americanism and Atlanticism.47 
On 30 January 2003, Poland, among eight other European States, signed 
the “Letter of Eight.”48 The signatories of this letter pledged to support the U.S. in 
its effort to “rid the world of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of 
mass destruction.”49 This letter showed that many European countries (including 
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Poland) held a different view on the Iraqi issue than the Franco-German tandem. 
Moreover, the “Letter of Eight” challenged the Franco-German leadership in 
Europe and was a kind of response to the Franco-German statement released 
during the January Elysée Treaty celebration. Schröder and Chirac asserted then 
that “For 40 years, each decisive step was taken in Europe thanks to the motor 
that Germany and France represent…. Experience shows that when Berlin and 
Paris agree, Europe can move forward; if there is disagreement, Europe marks 
time.”50 
It should be emphasized that Poland neither consulted nor notified France 
and Germany about signing the “Letter of Eight.” Poland continued to put good 
relations with U.S first, even before relations with France and Germany - the two 
main EU players. Furthermore, the political act, as the “Letter of Eight” can be 
acknowledged, was the signal of the future military intervention in Iraq.51  
The “Letter of Eight” and the “Vilnius 10”52 made the French president 
very angry. According to Philip Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Chirac was “deeply 
irritated with the notion that sovereign European countries, aspiring to EU 
membership, were taking instructions from an American ‘lobbyist’ with ties to the 
Bush White House.”53 On 17 February 2003, at the EU summit in Brussels, 
Jacques Chirac criticized the pro-American policy pursued by Poland and other 
Central European candidates for EU membership, saying that “they missed a 
good opportunity to keep quiet."54 The French president also suggested that in 
the face of the ensuing situation, the candidate countries’ EU membership was in 
danger. He said that  
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It should not be forgotten that a number of EU countries will have to 
ratify enlargement by referendum. And we already know that public 
opinion, as always when it’s a matter of something new, have 
reservations about enlargement, not really seeing exactly what 
their interest is in approving it. Obviously, then [what the Central 
Europeans have done] can only reinforce hostile public opinion 
sentiments among the 15 and especially those who will hold a 
referendum. Remember that all it takes is for one country not to 
ratify by referendum, for [enlargement] not to happen. Thus, I 
would say that these countries have been, let’s be frank, both not 
very well brought up and rather unconscious about the dangers 
that too quick an alignment with the American position could have 
for them.55 
At the Brussels summit, not only Jacques Chirac responded negatively on 
the “Letter of Eight,” but also EU Commission President Romano Prodi 
expressed anxiety about the candidate countries’ behavior. Prodi said that by 
their strong pro-Americanism, these countries revealed their failure to understand 
that the EU was not only an economic union but also the body which shared 
other values.56  Poland’s participation in a “gang of eight” was a subject of much 
controversy in Europe. The leaders of Germany and Russia harshly criticized 
Poland’s decision about signing the “Letter of Eight” and one of Germany’s 
newspapers called Poland “America’s Donkey.”57  
On 17 March 2003, ignoring the French warnings and the other countries’ 
criticism (and after Iraq ignored 14 consecutive resolutions of the UNSC calling 
this country to disarmament), the Polish Government decided to dispatch a 
relatively small contingent of 200 Polish troops to Iraq. The Polish Government 
perceived Poland’s participation in Iraq as the completion of NATO agreements 
concerning the endorsement of the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1441 that were comprised in the “Prague Summit Statement on 
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Iraq.”58 The same day, at the request of Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller, 
Polish President Kwasniewski endorsed the Polish Government’s decision about 
sending the Polish troops to Iraq.59 On 18 March 2003, he released a statement 
concerning the Polish decision: 
…we appeal to the international community for peace, but not at 
the cost of accepting crime, violence, and terrorism. We say ‘yes’ to 
peace if we can ensure it to all people across the world… I am 
convinced that the Cabinet’s request and my decision are right 
given the threats we must overcome, given the need to ensure 
global peace, and given commitments to our allies…. We are ready 
to use the contingent of Polish troops as part of the international 
coalition forces to contribute to enforcing compliance by Iraq with 
UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 and the 
related earlier resolutions….60 
These parts of Kwasniewski’s statement, which concerned a war with 
terrorism were fully coherent with Bush’s opinion on this issue. Moreover, the 
Polish president did not forget to mention that one of the main reasons that 
influenced the Polish decision were Poland’s commitments to its allies.  
On the day the decision was made, the Polish Defence Minister, Jerzy 
Szmajdzinski, informed the press that the Polish chemical decontamination 
platoon would be sent to the region of military conflict within a few days. In 
addition, he said that the Polish Operational Maneuver Reaction Group (GROM) 
and Polish logistical ship, Xawery Czarniecki, had already been in the Persian 
Gulf region. This public announcement left little doubt concerning the 
involvement of the Polish troops in the invasion on Iraq.  Poland’s participation in 
military action against Iraq acquires special significance on account of the fact 
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that except for the U.K., only Poland, among others signatories of the “Letter of 
Eight,” militarily supported the U.S. in the first days of the invasion.  
The presidential-governmental decision about sending Polish troops to 
Iraq was formally presented to the lower house of the Polish parliament (Sejm) 
only after the invasion, where it won the support of the majority. During the April 
parliamentary debate dedicated to the Iraqi mission, 328 MPs were in favor of the 
country’s involvement in an Iraqi conflict and 71 were against it.61 The Sejm and 
the Senat (the upper house of the Polish Parliament), which were trying to get 
more influence on the decision making process regarding Iraq, were pushed into 
the background. The initiative remained in the government’s and president’s 
hands. That approach was in conformity with the Polish Constitution and allowed 
faster and more effective decision-making.62  
C. THE EMERGENCE OF A DEBATE IN POLAND 
Unlike in the United Kingdom and Spain, initially in Poland there was 
virtually no debate or discussion on the decision concerning the participation of 
the Polish Armed Forces in the military intervention in Iraq. Moreover, there was 
no approval or formal resolution in the Polish Parliament.63 When Poland was 
asked to leave its troops and take up command of a multinational division in Iraq, 
there was no opposition from the side of the main Polish political parties. This 
situation nevertheless, changed when the situation in Iraq got worse and it 
became clear that the Polish expectations of tangible benefits turned out to be 
premature. 
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The invasion in Iraq was preceded in Europe by a wave of anti-war mass 
demonstrations. On 15 March 2003, Europe witnessed demonstrations of many 
millions of people. In London there were nearly one million people, Rome 
witnessed one to two million people on its streets and nearly one million people 
crowds demonstrated in both Barcelona and Madrid.64 In contrast, that day and 
within the next weeks in Poland there were not any mass demonstrations. 
Moreover, as already mentioned, the April parliamentary debate of 2003 reached 
the consensus regarding the country’s involvement in the Iraqi conflict. In such 
circumstances, on 6 June 2003 President Kwasniewski signed the decision 
concerning the participation of the Polish troops in the stabilization process in 
Iraq. It was decided that Poland would command a “Multinational Division Central 
South,” and the same would take responsibility for one of the occupation zones in 
that Arab country.65 The same month, during an interview granted to the press, 
the Polish president said that the decision to support the U.S. in Iraq 
considerably strengthened the Polish-American friendship. He also declared that 
Poland’s stance on Iraq had enhanced the position of Poland in the international 
arena.66  
Initially, the decision about the Polish participation in the stabilization 
process in Iraq did not give rise to any controversy among the Polish political 
elites. In addition, that decision was recognized by the political circles in Poland 
as a good opportunity to enhance Poland’s position as a close ally of the U.S. 
and Poland’s role as a security provider.67 
Overall, however, because of a domestic and international criticism, the 
Polish-American “honeymoon” seemed to come to an end in the latter half of 
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2003. Simultaneously, the relatively easily reached Polish political consensus as 
to the country’s involvement in the stabilization process in Iraq became a 
contentious issue.68 
In October 2003, one of the most fervent advocates of strengthening the 
Polish–American relations, the former national security adviser to President 
Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed his opinion in the Polish paper “Gazeta 
Wyborcza” regarding the Iraq issue. Regarding Poland’s presence in Iraq, he 
said among other things, that Poland “should avoid the exaggerated and 
unilateral manifestations” of its loyalty towards the U.S. and take into 
consideration the Franco-German stance on that issue.69 His comments 
stimulated strong public criticism of the Pollish government, and also among the 
Polish political elite, where doubts were rising about the legitimacy of the Polish 
presence in Iraq. 
Critical opinions were strengthened further when on 6 November 2003, 
the first Polish soldier, Major Kupczyk, perished in Iraq. From that moment on, 
the policy makers in Poland were under pressure to withdraw the Polish 
contingent. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, director of the Institute for Public Affairs, 
argued that ''people don't understand why we should mess in other people's 
countries. These are not our problems, not our continent, not our issues. The 
term international solidarity is hard to explain, especially when you express it in 
terms of army and occupation.''70 Jan Lopuszanski, a member of the League of 
Polish Families party, suggested that the Polish troops in Iraq did not struggle for 
Poland’s independence, but they fought against independence of other nations.  
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His opinion was that Polish intervention in Iraq had desecrated the honor of 
Poland, and that the motto of the “GWOT” has been only an excuse for achieving 
intended, political goals. 71 
On 7 November 2003, in the American paper “The Washington Post,” 
Radek Sikorski, the then executive director of the American Enterprise Institute's 
New Atlantic Initiative expressed his disappointment in the “Washington Post” 
about the lack of tangible benefits from the Polish presence in Iraq. With 
reference to the Polish and Bulgarian companies that hoped to get contracts for 
the reconstruction of Iraq, he wrote that unlike the American companies, both the 
Polish and Bulgarian companies “are still on the sidelines.” Moreover, he wrote 
that Poland and Bulgaria hoped that by siding with America they would be able to 
recover money that Iraq owed them for their people’s work. He further wrote that 
although that was a lot of money (some billions of dollars), Poland and Bulgaria 
“were being pressured to write off the money.”72 In his article, Sikorski also 
raised the visa question. The author states that Poland, although a close ally with 
the U.S., still did not get permission for its citizens to enter the U.S. without visas, 
while the citizens of France and Germany could enter America lacking visas. As 
Sikorski observed, “Small issues sometimes have a political effect out of all 
proportion to the cost of dealing with them, and this is one.”73 
An opinion poll carried out after the first Polish soldier perished in Iraq 
indicated that the majority of Poles did not support the Polish presence in the 
Republic of Iraq. According to a poll taken by CBOS (Public Opinion Research 
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Centre) on keeping the Polish presence in Iraq, 67% of respondents were 
opposed this idea, and 28% supported it. 74  
The Polish leadership’s stance on Iraq remained unchanged. During an 
interview granted to the Spanish daily “El Mundo,” the Polish president said that 
Polish troops would stay in Iraq because if Poland had then changed its strategy, 
it would have agreed with terrorists. In addition, he affirmed that although Poland 
was paying a high price, the aim was noble and that the Polish contingent would 
stay in Iraq to fulfill its mission.75 The Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Miller, said that 
Poland would not withdraw its troops from Iraq because Poland’s participation in 
combating terrorism was a struggle for its own security.76  
In 2004, the Polish governing coalition-Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and 
Labour Union (UP) began to grow weaker. The Iraq issue was discussed 
seldomly in Sejm and the Polish Government was under growing pressure from 
public opinion and some political circles.77  
In the springtime of 2004, three Polish political parties: the Polish Popular 
Alliance (PSL), Self Defence (Samoobrona), and the League of Polish Families 
(LPR) issued an appeal to the Polish government for the withdrawal of Polish 
troops from Iraq. In the autumn of that year, the co-governing Labour Union 
joined that initiative.78 Moreover, the two opposition parties: the Civic Platform 
(PO) and Law and Justice (PiS), which had voted for sending the Polish troops to 
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Iraq, began to express their disappointment and criticize the government for the 
lack of material benefits from Poland’s presence in Iraq.79 
In September 2004, a poll by CBOS (Public Opinion Research Centre) on 
the withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq, showed that 71% supported it. 80 In 
October 75% of the respondents said that Poland should withdraw its troops, a 
sentiment that was undoubtedly influenced by the growing number of Polish 
casualties.81 In view of the worsening situation in Iraq, the Polish public that had 
deeply believed in America’s ability to create positive changes in the world was 
becoming more and more disappointed about the U.S.’ difficulty in successfully 
fulfilling its mission in Iraq.82 In addition, the Polish citizens were disillusioned 
with the lack of American policy makers’ will to solve the problem in the case of 
non-visa movement for Poles, as well as with the low level of Polish companies’ 
involvement in post-war reconstruction projects in Iraq. 83 Telling it in a diplomacy 
way, only a handful of Polish firms were allowed to take part in the reconstruction 
projects in 2004. The disenchantment of Poles deepened when “BUMAR,” one of 
the biggest Polish arms companies, was deprived of a chance to sell its products 
to the new Iraqi army. From that moment on, the protests about Poland’s 
presence in Iraq grew stronger and what is more, an argument for closer 
cooperation with the EU emerged in Poland.84 
In view of growing domestic criticism aimed at the president and 
government regarding the visas issue, in August 2004, President Kwasniewski 
went on to the U.S. with the aim of exerting direct pressure on the visa issue. He 
was told that his query was inappropriate and that America’s stance on entry 
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visas for Poles was unchanging.85 Kwaśniewski made no attempt to hide his 
disappointment at that decision and said that he was hurt by it. Moreover, he said 
that as a politician he understood that decision, but “as a man, a human being, a 
friend of America, I do not understand it. In my opinion, a big country should be 
open, and sometimes more flexible, more gracious.”86 The visa question was 
raised again by Kwasniewski in February 2005, during his visit to the U.S. Again, 
Polish hopes of abolishing visas for Poles turned out to be in vain. Jakub Jedras, 
a correspondent of “TOL,” stated that the best example of President Bush’s 
attitude to Poland was a visit of the President of the Republic of Poland to the 
U.S. in February 2005: 
There was talk of the ‘strategic, lasting character’ of Polish-U.S. 
cooperation and a promise from President George Bush to try and 
squeeze $100 million from Congress to help modernize the Polish 
military, an offer that seems to have defused a Polish threat to 
scale back its presence in Iraq. The only thing marring the public 
performance was that Kwasniewski suddenly discovered that, to 
Bush, he was ‘Prime Minister Kwasniewski,’ not President 
Kwasniewski. 87 
The author stressed that for some observers it seemed to be clear that 
Washington treated Warsaw seriously only in the case of Iraq. 
In the face of that course of events, on 15 October 2004, in Sejm, Marek 
Belka, the then Polish prime minister, pledged a reduction of the number of 
Polish troops in Iraq from 2,400 to 1,500 soldiers. It was promised that the 
process of a gradual reduction of the Polish contingent in Iraq would start at the 
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very beginning of 2005.88 The same month, during an interview granted to the 
newspaper “Gazeta Wyborcza,” the then Minister of Defence Jerzy Szmajdzinski 
said that Poland would withdraw its troops from Iraq in December 2005, when the 
UN mandate expired. He emphasized that it would be done regardless of the 
situation in Iraq.89  
For the first time since 2003, Poland had not made its decision conditional 
on the American stance on Iraq. However, that promise of Minister Szmajdzinski 
turned out to be short-lived because Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government, which 
took over in autumn of 2005, proclaimed that Poland would keep its partly 
reduced contingent in Iraq “until the mission was accomplished.”90 In Kerry 
Longhurst and Marcin Zabrowski’s opinion, “The new government’s allegiance to 
the United States also manifested itself in the decision to continue with 
preparations for Poland’s inclusion in the U.S. missile defence system, a plan 
that had reached a critical stage by the autumn of 2006.”91 
In 2007, Donald Tusk92 (the candidate for premiership at that time), a 
leader of the Civic Platform party, was in favor of the withdrawal of Poland's 
troops from Iraq.93 During a pre-election debate on Polish public television, he 
said that the time had come to withdraw Polish troops from Iraq, because the 
Iraqi State had already been able to independently maintain law and order, so 
the presence of Polish troops in the Republic of Iraq was unnecessary. After 
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Tusk became a prime minister, the government kept that election promise and 
decided that the last Polish soldier would leave Iraq no later than on 31 
December 2008. This initiative is presently being carried out.  
D. THE POLISH SUPPORT OVER THE LONG HAUL 
Among the many arguments for Poland’s involvement in Iraq, only one 
turned out to be entirely feasible - the liberation of Iraqis from Saddam Hussein’s 
bloody dictatorship.94 The argument about the humanitarian promotion of 
democracy and freedom turned out to be very difficult to carry out. Today, both 
the politicians and military men seem to be much more skeptical in their 
assessment of the chances for Iraq’s democratization than they were in the 
period preceding the war.95 The threat posed to Poland by international terrorism 
is far from clear. Unlike the U.S., Poland is a country with a small Muslim minority 
and before the war, it did not purse an active policy in the Middle East that could 
threaten the interests of terrorist groups.96 Taking into account those 
demographic-political conditions, it can be asserted that Poland was not exposed 
to terrorist attacks before the war in Iraq. After Poland first took part in military 
intervention and then in the stabilization mission in Iraq, the risk of the terrorist 
attacks’ occurrence in Poland significantly increased.97 
Another justification for Poland’s decision to take part in the war, 
supposed benefits, met with mixed results. Many Polish companies did not get 
reconstruction contracts in Iraq. Moreover, one of the biggest Polish arms 
companies, “BUMAR,” bid on selling the armaments to the new Iraqi army but it 
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did not succeed, in part because this bid’s conditions were unclear.98 The Polish 
hopes for the U.S. military investments, connected with offset contract for selling 
F-16 jets to Poland, turned out to be premature.99 Henryk Szlajfer, the Polish 
ambassador to OSCE, admits that he has never believed, and he will never 
believe the theory, that thanks to the Iraqi war and close cooperation with the 
U.S., Poland was able to make a fortune. However, he believes that from the Iraq 
situation, Poland was “still reaping certain benefits, political included.”100 Overall, 
however, the issue that stirs up much controversy is the visa question. Despite 
the fact that Polish politicians have tried to bring their influence to bear on the 
American authorities to abandon the entry visas for Poles, the U.S.’ stance on 
this issue remains unchanging. Poles are embittered that they have such a 
difficult time getting the entry visas to the U.S. and that they have to pay a non-
refundable $100 fee just to talk with a consular official.101 Tomasz Wróblewski, 
editor-in-chief of the Polish edition of “Newsweek,” claims that by the abandoning 
entry visas for Poles the U.S. would prove its political respect for Poland and, all 
the same, would value Poland’s effort in Iraq.102 Presently the EU is negotiating 
with the U.S. for the condition of including the EU member states to the Visa 
Waiver Program. Poland is excluded from these talks due to the substantial 
proportion of rejected visa applications.103  
The Polish expectation that a close relationship with the U.S. would 
enhance Poland’s profile as a global actor and increase its prestige in the 
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international arena was not groundlessly optimistic. The fact that President 
Bush’s administration chose Poland to command a “Multinational Division Central 
South” in Iraq reflects the growing American perception of Poland as global 
actor.104 Moreover, the Polish diplomatic involvement during the 2004 Ukrainian 
“Orange Revolution” enhanced Poland’s profile as a global actor in Washington’s 
eyes.105 
Poland’s participation in the Iraqi crisis significantly worsened its relations 
with France and Germany. Adam Krzeminski claims that the decision to send 
troops to Iraq was right, in the sense that from the Polish perspective this 
decision was rational. However, he argues as well that the way in which Poland 
presented this issue to its European partners was a total disaster, and that 
“instead of, thanks to the support of America, gaining points in ‘inner core’ 
Europe we found ourselves in a situation resembling a constellation from a 
wholly different era: the Germans, French and Russians—our immediate 
neighbors-side by side in a ‘Petersburg Triangle’—and us with faraway Anglo-
Saxon allies.“106. Nevertheless, as the passions inspired by Poland’s initial 
support for the Americans have cooled, and as Polish public opinion has come to 
resemble that of the rest Europe, its relations with its EU partners have improved. 
Even after Poland took part in the war, the Franco-German tandem recognized 
Poland’s right to shape Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and, all the same, 
recognized it as a global actor.107 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The decision to send Polish troops to Iraq significantly strengthened the 
Polish-American relationship. However, the lack of tangible benefits for Poland 
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has subsequently cast a shadow over that relationship. It cannot be said that 
Poland attained no benefits, but these benefits were political and military, rather 
than economic in nature. Thanks to its involvement in Iraq, Poland enhanced its 
prestige in the international arena. Moreover, the intervention in Iraq was a good 
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III. THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM CONTROVERSY IN 
POLAND 
In June 2001, during the NATO Brussels summit, Poland endorsed 
Washington’s ballistic missile defense program. In this matter, as in its 
subsequent support of the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish State wanted 
to prove its loyalty toward the United States of America and underline Poland’s 
political Atlanticism.108 Russia and the other European-NATO members were on 
the other side of this issue, as would be expected.109 
In 2006, when Poland was invited by the U.S. to take part in bilateral 
consultations about deploying some elements of the American anti-missile shield 
on Polish soil, Russia and the other NATO capitals again voiced their criticism. 
Nevertheless, Poland decided to take part in negotiations about the U.S. 
proposal to deploy a “ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the 
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)“110 in Poland. Among European 
NATO members, it is generally believed that direct talks with Poland were 
intended by the United States to marginalize the Atlantic Alliance. In the ensuing 
controversy, the U.S. officials tried to reassure its European NATO partners. 
Against the background of inter-NATO debate, Russia demonstrates its 
strong opposition to the U.S. initiative. By means of intimidation, Russia wants to 
force Poland to withdraw immediately from negotiations on the U.S. proposal.  
Poland’s stance on this issue, however, stays constant. However, Donald Tusk’s 
government, which took over in Poland after the parliamentary elections of 2007, 
wants some tangible benefits for Poland from its involvement in this project. 
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A. DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON THE ISSUE IN POLAND 
Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that Poland should agree to host 
elements of America’s missile defense shield on its territory, on the condition that 
the U.S. provide Poland with additional safety guarantees against the threat 
resulting from it. 111 The United States of America should specifically promise 
Poland to respond militarily, if Poland were to become the target of a hostile 
military action because of the shield’s presence. 112 He has also emphasized that 
the U.S. should assure Poland that it will not be guided by Russia’s reservations, 
and will commit itself to compensating Poland for any negative consequences, 
including political or economic retaliation from Russia. 113 
Another scholar, Henryk Szlajfer, supports the idea of placing the 
American shield in Poland, and simultaneously challenges some critics’ claim 
that the shield has an offensive character. He emphasizes its deterrent character:  
I think that either we are dealing with a confusion of notions or with 
a peculiar ‘roundabout reasoning’: the system assumed to 
neutralize or—with the use of intercepting missiles—to substantially 
reduce the effectiveness of an enemy (conventional and/or nuclear) 
ballistic missile attack, i.e. of the enemy’s offensive weapons, as its 
‘side’ effect improves the effectiveness of our own possible 
‘response’ with offensive weapons (missiles). Even if this is the 
case, this does not change the basic description of the missile 
defence system, of a ‘shield’ rather than of a ‘sword,’ with a strongly 
emphasized strategic deterrence function.114 
Another author, Pawel Zalewski, claims that the anti-missile shield will 
give Poland a new, very beneficial geopolitical position, and that Poland will reap 
rewards for playing host to U.S. interceptors. He suggests that, thanks to the 
shield, Poland’s security will increase, and what is more important, that Poland 
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will become a part of America’s defense system. Given that the United States’ 
defense budget dwarfs that of the EU, Poland would be sacrificing a good deal of 
security if its defense policy rested only on cooperation with Europe. 115 
Public opinion in Poland opposes the deployment of an anti-missile shield 
on its territory. According to a poll taken by CBOS (Public Opinion Research 
Centre) on deployment of an anti-missile shield in Poland, 60% of respondents 
oppose the move, and 26% support it. 116 
Roman Kuźniar states that if Poland agrees to deploying the elements of 
an American anti-missile shield on its soil, it will cause the appearance of “an 
asymmetry of benefits.”117 “The possible installation of elements of the system 
will in practice make our security situation worse and will result in a serious curb 
on our sovereignty.”118 Kuźniar also argues that the system is dangerous for 
Poland, because it will be created not to protect Poland’s territory but U.S. 
territory, and what is more, the U.S. will improve its security at Poland’s expense. 
119 He believes that if the system were deployed within NATO structures, it would 
not be dangerous: “an allied anti-ballistic missile system is more difficult to build 
and to operate, but it excludes commercial motives for building one and 
minimizes the risk of its unjustified, offensive use. It would be a deterrent rather 
than an element of coercion against the others.”120 
Olaf Osica, an analyst at the Natolin European Centre, argues that Poland 
would theoretically become a part of the American defense system and that the 
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U.S. system would cooperate with the Polish one. 121 “However, the disparity in 
power between the two states gives rise to concerns that this type of 
consolidation may, in practice, only translate into a lasting dependence on the 
stronger partner and, more importantly, a dependence of an institutional 
nature.”122 He also affirms that if Poland really becomes an inseparable part of 
the American defense system, then two aspects of the Polish-American 
relationship have to become a subject of special attention. “Firstly, the shield has 
to be of an ally-like nature. Secondly, the appropriate burden of obligations must 
be placed on the U.S., which would allow Poland to pursue its objectives. This 
burden cannot be a general political promise to ‘defend against threats’ or 
‘support initiatives’, but needs to have a tangible and concrete and lasting 
institutional and financial dimension. Unlike the situation in Iraq, if a decision is 
taken with respect to a joint national defence system there will be no turning back 
for many decades to come.”123 
B. LINKAGE TO NATO 
The U.S. proposal to deploy a “ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) 
element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)“124 in Europe has been 
carried out bilaterally with the Czech Republic and Poland, the countries that are 
the potential hosts of this installation. The U.S. proposes deploying 10 Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland, and a radar installation in the Czech 
Republic.125 The GBIs guided by the radar would intercept the missiles aimed at 
the U.S. and most of NATO Europe from the Middle East.126 The U.S. 
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government indicates that the installation in Poland would protect 75 percent of 
European territory, while the southeastern part of Europe and Turkey would be 
outside of the shield’s scope and would have to be protected by shorter-range 
missile defense systems.127 
In March 2005, the North Atlantic Council launched the Active Layered 
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence programme (ALTBMD).128 “ALTBMD will 
integrate various theatre missile defence systems into a coherent network for the 
protection of deployed forces, with an initial operational capability in 2010.”129 
This system “will be a NATO-funded command and control ‘backbone’ which will 
integrate sensors and interceptors provided by member nations, such as 
American and multi-national systems of various capabilities.”130 
The fact that the U.S. started bilateral negotiations about the U.S. Ballistic 
Missile Defense System with Poland and the Czech Republic without any 
consultations with its NATO allies and the EU has led to considerable tensions 
within NATO and the EU. The EU has been upset because two of its members 
(Poland and the Czech Republic) have been negotiating with the U.S. on an 
issue that affects the European Security and Defence Policy.131 
In bypassing NATO in its talks with Poland and the Czech Republic, the 
U.S. caused the marginalization of the Atlantic Alliance and this could not be 
perceived as a good sign for European security issues.132 Some critics implied 
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that Washington did not want to work primarily through its NATO allies because 
of the unlikelihood of reaching a compromise on the system.133 
As Alexander Bitter has observed, “When the debate about the American 
plans arose in Europe at the beginning of 2007, the USA began to canvass its 
European partners.”134 In February 2007, Lieutenant General Trey Obering, 
Director of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency (MDA), went to Berlin to talk about 
the main goals of the U.S. BMD undertaking and seek European support for that 
enterprise.135 In March the same year in Berlin, Obering presented the opinion 
that if NATO decided to establish an Alliance-wide BMD system, capable of 
intercepting long-range missiles, the U.S. missile defense components in Poland 
and the Czech Republic could become American contributions towards the 
system.136 At the same briefing, the MDA Director was “skeptical about whether 
NATO members would be willing to pick up the costs of such a system.”137 
On 19 April 2007 at NATO headquarters in Brussels, at a NATO-Russia 
Council meeting, the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Eric Edelman discussed 
successful NATO cooperation in the field of defense during the Cold War and 
underlined his view that such coupling is a good idea nowadays in the face of 
new threats and new challenges.138 In response, “NATO Secretary-General Jaap 
de Hoop Scheffer concurred, saying ’the principle of the indivisibility of security’ is 
a view held unanimously by the 26 NATO members.”139 Apart from Eric 
Edelman, two other U.S. government officials (Lieutenant General Trey Obering, 
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Director of the U.S. Missile Defence Agency, and Assistant Secretary of State 
John Rood), were present in Brussels on that date to address the NATO-Russia 
Council and the North Atlantic Council. Their address was about “plans to 
negotiate the deployment of 10 ground-based interceptor missiles to Poland and 
a radar system to the Czech Republic as a way to broaden the effectiveness of 
the anti-missile shield.”140 
According to the U.S. government officials, the U.S. proposal for Poland 
and the Czech Republic permits NATO to avoid duplicating some elements of its 
missile defense system,141 and what America is planning to deploy in Europe has 
been designed to complement the proposed NATO system.142 
The NATO members share the view that any U.S. missile defense 
installations deployed in Europe or North America should complement any NATO 
missile defense installations.143 
On 27 May 2007 in Madeira, Portugal, at the joint meeting of the Defence 
and Security Committee and the Science and Technology Committee on Missile 
Defence, Robert Bell, Senior Vice President, European Business Development, 
SAIC, said that in view of the absence of a NATO defence system capable of 
protecting territories (NATO ALTBMD will be limited to the protection of deployed 
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safety of NATO citizens.144 He also suggested that ALTBMD could protect those 
remaining parts of Europe that would be beyond the scope of the U.S. missile 
defense system.145 
On 14-15 June 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited 
Brussels, Belgium, and took part in meetings with NATO defense ministers and 
with the NATO-Russia Council. Gates said that throughout the meetings in 
Brussels, none of the NATO countries criticized the U.S. missile defence plans 
regarding Poland and the Czech Republic. 146 He also stated that NATO and the 
United States would discuss how to make both missile defense systems work 
together.147 
On 14 June 2007 in Brussels, NATO defence ministers decided to carry 
out a study “of a complementary ‘bolt-on’ anti missile capability that would protect 
the southeastern part of alliance territory that would not be covered by the 
planned U.S. interceptors.”148 American officials interpreted that decision “as an 
implied endorsement of the U.S. GMD plan and an adaptation of NATO plans to 
fit the proposed U.S. system.”149 
On 14 June 2007, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
released a statement. “‘In essence, the alliance will pursue a three-track 
approach,’ de Hoop Scheffer said in the statement. The three tracks include: 
continue the ongoing NATO project to develop by 2010 a theater missile-defense 
for protecting deployed troops; assess the full implications of the U.S. system; 
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and continue existing cooperation with Russia on theater missile defense, as well 
as consultation on related issues.”150 According to NATO Secretary-General 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, nowadays for NATO the most important principle is not 
only “indivisibility of security,” but also protection for all 26 allies against future 
threats.151 
C. POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF BMD 
During the term of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government, diplomatic relations 
between Poland and Russia were bad. Kaczynski’s government didn’t seem to 
attach great significance to Russia’s stance on the idea of hosting elements of 
America’s missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. Moreover, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government refused to discuss the issue with Russia.152 
From the very beginning of Polish and Czech consultations with the U.S. 
about deploying some elements of the American anti-missile shield on Polish and 
Czech soil, Russian opinion on that issue was very skeptical. 
On 22 January 2007, Russian General Wladimir Popowkin criticized the 
idea of planting some elements of the U.S. anti-missile shield in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. He said that a Russian analysis showed that anti-missile 
interceptors in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic would threaten 
Russia’s territory.153 In response, Poland’s vice foreign minister said that the 
Russians know that those missiles are designed to intercept other missiles and 
are not to be used as an offensive weapon, so the territory of Russia is not 
threatened.154 
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When Poland and the Czech Republic started an official bilateral 
negotiation with the U.S., Russian expressions of discontent and criticism got 
stronger. On 26 October 2007, at an EU-Russia summit in Mafra, Portugal, 
Wladimir Putin, the president of Russia, argued that “American plans for a missile 
shield in Europe pose as grave a challenge to Moscow as the Cuban missile 
crisis did in the 1960s.”155 According to Putin, “For us, technologically, the 
situation is very similar. On our borders such threats to our country are being 
created.” 156 Moreover, Putin declared that Russia was planning to withdraw from 
the treaty of limitation concerning conventional forces in Europe, and suggested 
that that “Russia would find it difficult to stay in the intermediate-range nuclear 
forces treaty (INF), signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in 
December 1987.”157 
On 21 October 2007, a parliamentary election was held in Poland. 
Jarosław Kaczynski’s government was defeated by a center-right party, the Civic 
Platform. Donald Tusk, a leader of the Civic Platform, became the new prime 
minister of the Republic of Poland. This government declared that it was much 
more interested in keeping good bilateral relations with Russia than the previous 
one. 
Russia seemed to be pleased with such a declaration from the Polish side. 
However, Moscow’s discontent and criticism about planned U.S. initiatives did 
not let up, and Russia even started to intimidate Poland.  
On 15 December 2007, the head of the Russian armed forces' general 
staff Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky said that Russia might wrongly perceive an antimissile  
 
                                            
155 Damien McElroy and Adrian Blomfield, “Putin: US risking new Cuban missile crisis,” 
Telegraph (October 22, 2007), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/27/wputin127.xml [Accessed 
October 29, 2007]. 
156 Mark Tran, „Putin warns of new Cuban missile crisis.”Guardian Unlimited (October 26, 
2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2200120,00.html [Accessed October 30, 2007]. 
157 Ibid. 
 43
interceptor launched from Poland as a missile with a nuclear warhead. In such a 
case, he added, Russia automatically would reply by launching missiles against 
installations in Poland. 158 
He explained that the U.S. antimissile interceptors would fly over Russian 
territory, and that Russian surveillance systems are governed by a computer. If 
the computer made a mistake and incorrectly concluded that the U.S. had 
attacked Russia, it would reply with saturation bombing. The main targets would 
include the antimissile rocket launchers in Poland.159  
Moscow’s message was that the only means of safety in this situation for 
Poland would be an immediate breaking off of the talks with the Americans.160 
In response to Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky’s threats on 16 December 2007, on 
Polish television TVN-24 Donald Tusk said that any Russian generals’ statement 
would not change the course of Polish-American negotiations on the antimissile 
shield. Moreover, Tusk said that such statements are unacceptable and 
expressed his regret over the ensuing situation.161 
The first signal of a thaw in Polish-Russian relations came on 18 
December 2007, when Poland and Russia said “that they would hold 
consultations over plans by the United States to deploy elements of a missile-
defense system in Eastern Europe.”162 President Putin’s advisor Sergei V. 
Yastrzhembsky said that Polish-Russian talks could be held in Poland at the 
beginning of 2008.163 
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On 21 January 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Poland, Radosław Sikorski, paid a working visit to Moscow and met with Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. During his visit Sikorski said that Poland, “unlike 
Russia, has no ballistic missiles or nuclear weapons. The anti-missile defense 
system will defend Europe against ballistic missiles’ threats and we understand 
Russia’s interest in this aspect.”164 Simultaneously, he said that the decision 
about the deployment of Ground-Based Interceptors would be taken between the 
U.S.A. and Poland.165 Sergei Lavrov said that Russia “will not exert pressure on 
Poland or on other participants in the negotiations on the U.S. plan to build 
missile defense bases in Europe.”166 
After a six-year break in mutual visits between Polish and Russian Prime 
Ministers, on 8 February 2008 the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, paid a 
one day visit to Moscow. This visit was a chance to thaw the Russian-Polish 
relation that had chilled under Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government. Tusk talked to 
President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov and Deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitri Medvedev. “The meetings were cordial although Russia did not 
soften its stance on any of the key issues regarding Poland.”167 During his visit to 
Moscow, Tusk did not talk to Putin about the idea of placing the American shield 
in Poland, and the subsequent course of events showed that Russia’s stance on 
that issue remained unchanging.168 
On 14 February 2008, at the annual conference with reporters at the 
Kremlin, President Putin said that Russia may have to target its rockets at the 
planned U.S. BMD installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. According to 
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Putin, this step would be dictated by the opinions of Russian experts who believe 
that the system poses a threat to Russian security. 169 
D. POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF BMD 
In April 2001, an anonymous Senate staffer said that “For Poland, unlike 
other U.S. allies, the issue of ballistic missile defence does not represent a 
serious bone of contention between Washington and Warsaw. Indeed Poland 
has been more forthcoming than most European allies in its support for this 
initiative.”170 
The U.S. proposal to deploy a “ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) 
element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)”171 in Poland was 
well received by the Polish government. During the Polish-U.S. bilateral 
consultations about deploying some elements of an American anti-missile shield 
on Polish soil, the Republic of Poland received an official U.S. invitation to take 
part in negotiations on that issue. 
On 23 February 2007, during the term of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s 
government, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted to the U.S. Embassy 
a diplomatic note comprising: 
• “the Polish Government’s consent to start negotiations; 
• the Polish Government’s stance emphasizing that for Poland the 
main aim of negotiations will be strengthening the security of 
Poland, the security of the U.S., and the international security; 
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• a reservation saying that the possible negotiated agreements will 
become then in Poland the subjects of ratification.”172 
Kaczynski’s government, as well as the previous one, almost 
unconditionally supported the idea of hosting America’s missile-defense shield in 
Poland. The Polish government’s position maintained that “the shield would 
serve as a deterrent against possible enemies, believing that although there is no 
direct danger at the moment, it might appear within 10 to 20 years. Some 
government officials have also emphasized a perceived threat from Russia.”173 
Kaczynski’s twin brother, Lech, the Polish President, also expressed 
himself positively on this project. On 16 July 2007 Lech Kaczynski paid an official 
visit to the U.S. After talks with President Bush, at a press conference the Polish 
president said that “The matter of the shield is largely a foregone 
conclusion….The shield will exist because for Poland this will be a very good 
thing.”174 
The present Polish government, unlike the previous one, takes the view 
that Poland should take a tougher position on the question of hosting elements of 
America’s missile defense shield in Poland. 
On 7 January 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Poland, Radosław Sikorski, said that the new Polish government “is not prepared 
to accept American plans to deploy missile-defense bases in Poland until all 
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costs and risks are considered.” 175Two days later, Poland’s Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk said that Poland’s agreement to the deployment of an American 
missile defense shield on Polish soil “is going to be directly tied to increasing 
Poland's security.”176 He also expressed the opinion that so far Poland “has not 
received assurances or a guarantee that hosting an American missile defense 
base in Poland will increase the security level of our country.”177 The same week, 
Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich said that if the U.S. did not equip the 
Polish Armed Forces with short-and-medium-range systems like THAAD and 
Patriot, Poland would refuse to host some elements of America’s missile defense 
shield on its territory.178 
After a visit of Polish Ministry of Defence officials to the U.S.A. in January 
2008, Polish Minister of Defence Bogdan Klich said that the U.S. government 
was more ready to meet Poland’s demands connected with hosting elements of 
America’s missile-defense shield in Poland than it had been before.179 
The January course of events showed that Donald Tusk’s government 
was a much harder negotiator than Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government. The 
Polish government officials acted very decisively to force the U.S. reaction. 
Within a few weeks, the U.S. reacted positively for Poland. 
In February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 
Radosław Sikorski, paid a visit to the U.S. During one of the meetings, he talked 
to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about the American initiative and the 
Polish expectations of tangible benefits for the Polish Armed Forces. At the press 
                                            
175Judy Dempsey „Poland Signals Doubts About Planned U.S. Missile-Defense Bases on Its 
Territory,” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/07/world/europe/07shield.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=sikorski&oref=s
login [Accessed January 9, 2008]. 
176 “Poland raises stakes to host U.S. missile shield,” 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/6335503.html [Accessed January 30, 2008]. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179„USA spełnią nasze postulaty?,” http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news/usa-spelnia-nasze-
postulaty,1042575 [Accessed January 15, 2008]. 
 48
conference, both Rice and Sikorski suggested that “the United States would help 
with Polish air defenses, which Poland requested in the deal.”180 Moreover, 
Sikorski said that “There is still a great deal of work for our experts but yes, I am 
satisfied that the principles that we have argued for have been accepted.”181 
On 10 March Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk met President Bush in 
Washington. President Bush said that “the U.S. will help modernize the Polish 
military as part of a deal to place part of a new U.S. missile defense system in 
the country.”182 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
For Poland, the best solution would be to “bolt” together the U.S. 
antimissile shield (including 10 U.S. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland, 
and a radar installation in the Czech Republic) with the NATO Active Layered 
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD). This solution is probable, taking into 
account the fact that NATO decided to assess the full implications of the U.S. 
system by March 2008. It would allow Poland to avoid being perceived as an 
“American Trojan Horse” among the NATO allies. Nevertheless, Russia will still 
try to intimidate Poland. As the negotiations move closer to the final “deal” 
between the U.S. and Poland, stronger reservations may be expressed by 
Russia. 
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF POLAND’S CFSP AND ESDP POLICY 
Initially, the Polish stand on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was skeptical and 
lacking in enthusiasm.183 This was not surprising in view of the events that took 
place in 1999 and 2000. Poland regarded the ESDP initiatives as an attempt to 
exclude it from the European decision making process. Polish decision-makers 
viewed the CFSP/ESDP as a policy competing with NATO and the U.S.A.184 
However, since 2003, the Polish attitude towards CFSP and ESDP has gradually 
begun to change. After Poland in 2004 joined the E.U. structures, its involvement 
in the CFSP/ESDP initiatives significantly increased. 
A. POLAND’S CFSP AND ESDP POLICY BEFORE 2003 
On 4 June 1999, at the EU summit in Cologne, leaders of EU member 
states decided to create a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which 
“would leave non-EU NATO states, like Poland, ‘consulted’ but crucially 
‘excluded’ from the actual decision-making process.”185 For Poland, that 
enterprise was a serious bone of contention between the EU and Poland. 
At this point, Warsaw harbored two kinds of reservations concerning 
ESDP. Firstly, Warsaw argued that NATO was the best place to develop 
European defence capabilities and, more precisely, within NATO’s European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), launched in the mid-1990s. Moreover, 
unlike ESDI, ESDP ushered in an institutional and political competition between 
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the EU and NATO. Secondly, Warsaw noted that Poland, like other non-EU 
NATO European states, found itself formally excluded from ESDP.186 
Before the next EU summit, which was scheduled to take place in 
December 1999 in Helsinki, Polish government officials nurtured a hope that their 
doubts and fears on the character of the ESDP would be dispelled. However, the 
future evaporated their hopes.187 
The Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on 
Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence declared 
that: 
The European Union should have the autonomous capacity to take 
decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and 
then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international 
crises in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP)…Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the 
non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in 
the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and 
capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take 
part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets…Other 
countries who are candidates for accession to the EU may also be 
invited by the Council to take part in EU-led operations once the 
Council has decided to launch such an operation. …Russia, Ukraine 
and other European States engaged in political dialogue with the 
Union and other interested States may be invited to take part in the 
EU-led operations. 188 
For Poland, the candidate to the EU, it became clear that the EU placed 
the non-EU NATO European countries on an equal level with Russia and 
Ukraine. This situation was unacceptable for Poland. Bronisław Geremek, the 
                                            
186 Olaf Osica, „In Search of a New Role: Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relations” in Poland-A new 
power in Transatlantic Security, 33-34. 
187 Olaf Osica, “Wspólna europejska polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony (CFSP) w 
perespektywie Polski,” Center for International Relations, Warszawa 2001, 18. 
188 Annex I to Annex IV Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on 
Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki European Council - Annex IV of the Presidency 
Conclusions [Accessed March 20, 2008]. 
 51
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, reticently delivered the Helsinki Presidency 
Report, saying that those regulations did not give him satisfaction.189 
The tension between Poland and the EU persisted until June 2000, when 
Poland at the Feira summit “submitted its own proposal envisaging the more 
comprehensive involvement of the six in ESDP. With active support from the 
United Kingdom, most of the Polish proposals were agreed in Feira and shortly 
afterwards. As a result, a ‘15+6 ‘committee was created with the purpose of 
discussing ESDP issues between EU member states and non –EU European 
NATO members. The six were also given an opportunity to take part in the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC).”190 The PSC linked the ESDP with the 
broader CFSP. According to Olaf Osica, “The agreement broke Turkey’s 
resistance to allowing the EU permanent and guaranteed access to NATO assets 
and capabilities, and to the talks on the rules underpinning EU cooperation with 
the Alliance.”191 The Polish state made an effort to “bridge the gap between the 
EU-15 and the non –EU-6.”192 
Since 1999, Poland has generally perceived CFSP/ESDP as a policy 
competing with NATO and the U.S.A. For Poland, the United States of America 
was perceived as the ultimate guarantor of its security. Simultaneously, the EU 
was regarded as the organization dealing with social, economic and political 
issues, while NATO was considered as a body which provides Poland with hard 
security guarantees. When the EU launched the ESDP, it was not surprising that 
Poland was not enthusiastic about the EU’s interference in matters that fell within 
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NATO’s competence. But, bearing in mind the future EU enlargement, Poland did 
not want to overly criticize the ESDP, but tried to make this enterprise more 
Atlantic.193 
The EU’s intention to broaden its CFSP’s scope to the military dimension 
became a factor creating concerns not only in Poland, but also in the United 
States. It can be said that Polish and American stances on the ESDP coincided 
in many respects. The Polish government and the Bush administration realized 
that “there was a certain inevitability over some form of ESDP and as such the 
most important approach to this policy initiative is one which seeks to manage its 
impact on the alliance rather than to fight it on principle.”194 Bronislaw 
Komorowski, the Polish Minister of Defence, said that Poland wanted its best 
friend, the U.S., to be involved in European issues, and simultaneously the Polish 
State wanted to support the development of European initiatives within the scope 
of defence and security.195 
The events of 11 September 2001 mobilized the NATO members to fight 
against a common enemy, terrorism. The Global War on Terrorism started in 
Afghanistan, where NATO members sent their troops. Poland has actively 
participated in this enterprise. 
On 4 November 2001, at British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s invitation, a 
meeting of six EU member state leaders took place in London. The leaders of the 
U.K, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Holland met to talk about the common 
EU response to the events of 9/II. The other members of the EU were not invited, 
including the Belgians, who then held the EU's presidency. This enterprise made 
the smaller EU member states furious because they found themselves excluded 
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from the decision making process and recognized the British-French-German 
initiative as a big countries’ “directorate.”196 
Non-EU states, including Poland, were disappointed with the British-
French-German project. For Poland, as a candidate to join the EU, the idea of 
creating a “steering committee” aimed at a directorate in CFSP/ESDP matters 
was absolutely unacceptable.197 
Overall, before the 2002-2003 Iraq crisis and Poland’s admission to the 
EU in 2004, CFSP and ESDP were never the center of attention for the Polish 
political elite or the public.198 By 2003, Warsaw conducted a policy aimed at 
limiting the scope of the ESDP; and, to some extent, this process has been 
carried on today.199 Moreover, Poland almost unconditionally backed the U.S. 
initiatives, thereby enhancing its role as America’s protégé in the Eastern part of 
Europe.200 However, Poland’s attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP has changed 
since its engagement in Iraq.201 
B. POLAND’S CFSP AND ESDP POLICY 2003-2007 
The second stage of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was continued 
in Iraq. In spite of harsh world and European criticism, Poland sided with the U.S. 
The decision to support the U.S. in Iraq considerably strengthened the Polish-
American friendship and enhanced the position of Poland in the international 
arena. It was not an unimportant matter for Polish politicians and Polish citizens 
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who depended on some kind of benefits that might potentially be accompanied 
with that enterprise. The future events proved that Poland’s expectations of 
notable economic and political benefits pinned upon its participation in operation 
“Iraqi Freedom” turned out to be overly optimistic. More than that, Poland was 
disappointed with American leadership in Iraq. 202 
Looking back on the gradual change in the Polish attitude towards the 
CFSP/ESDP some years later, it can be said confidently that the Iraqi factor, 
together with two others, was the main contributor to the initiation of this process. 
The second factor concerned the closeness of the Polish membership in the EU, 
thereby gaining the right of inclusion in the ESDP decision-making process. The 
third factor concerned positive changes in the nature of the ESDP. Initially, this 
European project expressed ill-defined priorities and aspirations that were not 
necessarily viewed positively by Poland. Throughout 2003, the role of the EU as 
a foreign and security actor became clearer as did the purpose and the “mission” 
of the ESDP.203 
In 2003, as a part of the ESDP, the EU launched three missions: in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
On 1 January 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) started in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH). The EUPM took over from the United Nation International 
Police Task Force in BiH. The main aim of this mission was to establish local law 
enforcement capabilities through mentoring, monitoring and inspection activities. 
Poland, as a non EU member state contributed to the EUPM twelve police 
officers. On 31 March 2003, the EU launched its first-ever military operation 
“Concordia” in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was aimed at 
securing a stable environment and allowing the implementation of the August 
2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. Poland contributed 17 military officers. 
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During this operation NATO assets and capabilities were used. In 2003, the EU 
conducted the military operation "Artemis" in Bunia, Eastern Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). This was the first EU mission outside Europe, and during this 
operation, the NATO assets were used.204 
Thanks to those three missions, the EU not only demonstrated that it 
could “go global” but also this organization began to be perceived as a security 
actor. Moreover, Poland concluded that NATO and the EU were able to 
cooperate successfully within realms, which in the past, according to the Polish 
point of view, had been separately assigned to each of them.205 
On the eve of the first EU military operation “Concordia” in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on 12 March 2003 at the Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation in Berlin, the Polish Foreign Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 
addressed the lecture entitled “Future of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy.” During the lecture, he claimed that: 
Poland regards the developing European Security and Defence Policy 
as a necessary complement to the CFSP in its operational dimension, 
and as its integral part. Being a NATO member and regarding the 
Alliance as the guarantee of its members' security, Poland believes 
that the tasks of the Alliance and EU are complementary, to the 
benefit of all member states. We do not find any contradiction in 
developing NATO defence capabilities and an efficient ESDP. 
Moreover, it is only by co-operating and acting together that NATO 
and the EU can effectively serve our security interests. 206 
Moreover, he said that Polish officials believed that further close 
cooperation between NATO and the EU would lead to further strengthening of 
those two organizations.207 In a similar tone was a statement by the Secretary of 
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State in the Polish MoD, Andrzej Towpik.  On 23 March 2003 in Warsaw at the 
conference entitled “European Union as a security community,” he said that 
“Poland regards itself as militarily capable of participating in CESDP, and has 
political ambitions to act as one of the European leaders in the field.”208 
In December 2001, as a result of the Laeken Declaration, the European 
Council established the Convention on the Future of Europe or the European 
Convention. The main purpose of this body was to produce a draft constitution 
for the EU. 209 Some proposals regarding the CFSP/ESDP, which emerged from 
the European Convention’s working groups were welcomed by the Polish 
government within the twelve months of 2003. Poland was forthcoming about 
issues concerning the CFSP and supported the idea of Jean-Lucks Dehaene’s 
working group to broaden the authority of a foreign minister on the European 
Commission and the Council of Ministers (so called “double hat”). Moreover, 
Poland backed the idea of establishing the European Union’s diplomatic service 
and giving the union a “legal personality.” In addition, Polish representatives 
recognized the necessity of developing the EU security strategy (ESS).210 
Warsaw also recognized the EU’s need to enhance its planning capacity and 
supported the British initiative to install a European autonomous planning cell at 
NATO headquarters - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 
Belgium.211 
However, not all the European Convention’s proposals and initiatives 
regarding the CFSP/ESDP were positively perceived by Poles. On the proposals 
concerning the ESDP, which were put forward by Michel Barnier’s working group, 
the Polish stance was qualified. Warsaw supported the inclusion of a mutual 
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defence clause and the creation of an EU Armaments and Research Agency, but 
voiced reservations about the idea of “enhanced cooperation,” stressing the need 
for the inclusive nature of that cooperation. 212 
On 29 April 2003, in Le Touquet, Belgium, four EU Member States, 
Germany, Luxembourg, France and Belgium met at the invitation of the Belgian 
Prime Minister. They discussed enhanced cooperation between them in the field 
of security and in more detail, the ESDP. The same day, they issued a joint 
communiqué in which those countries encouraged the European Convention “to 
consider including a number of provisions in the new Treaty with defence 
implications and to open up the possibility for a group of countries to seek 
enhanced cooperation in defence matters should they so wish.”213 Poland could 
not accept such a stance and, in consequence, on September 9, 2003, the 
government of the Republic of Poland formulated a critical judgment in regard to 
the European Convention’s approach to the CFSP issues proposed in the Treaty 
Establishing the Constitution for Europe. Poland made a postulate, which 
involved “ensuring the participation of all EU members in decisions defining the 
cooperation mechanisms in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(and in issues concerning the ESDP), as well as including a stipulation regarding 
the role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security system (which in practice meant an 
objection to the establishment of defence structures in the EU which could be 
competitive towards NATO).”214 
The Republic of Poland, however, had changed its stance before the 
meeting of foreign ministers, which took place in November 2003 in Naples, Italy. 
The change in Poland’s stance was brought about by an agreement on the 
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concept of “structural cooperation” (enhanced cooperation) by the three major 
EU players-Germany, France and Great Britain. A new version of the draft 
protocol concerning structural cooperation was settled. This draft did not exclude 
from the structural cooperation those countries which were less technologically 
developed, and the number of conditions which those countries had to meet to 
participate in this process significantly diminished. Poland therefore decided to 
back the concept of structural cooperation.215 
The year 2003 also witnessed Warsaw’s support for the European 
Security Strategy, which is the integral part of the CFSP and ESDP. Poland 
welcomed the ESS as a valuable contribution to the European security. The idea 
of a stronger EU, which would be more active in the international arena appealed 
to Warsaw because it was compatible with Polish interests. Moreover, Poland 
held the view that some kind of independence from the UN was needed, and 
took the view that in some situations a decision to use force might be taken 
without the mandate of the UN Security Council. In addition, Polish officials tried 
unsuccessfully, through a separate paragraph on transatlantic relations, to be 
included in the ESS.216 
On 1 May 2004, Poland became a fully-fledged member of the European 
Union. As a new member of this organization, the Polish state no longer had to 
be afraid that it would be perceived as an “outsider” in the European “league.” 
From the very beginning, Poland opposed many initiatives concerning the 
CFSP and the ESDP, such as the Franco-German-British Directoire or structural 
cooperation which emerged from the European Convention, and which were 
aimed at greater flexibility and closer cooperation within the group of the biggest 
EU member states. Entering the new structures, the Polish government realized 
that Poland could become a member of that group. The Polish politicians drew 
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such a conclusion by taking into consideration two factors. Firstly, in their view, 
Poland performed a prominent role in Iraq. Secondly, the perception of Poland as 
an “irritating partner” had changed and was replaced by a view of Poland as a 
natural member of the EU.217 
Those Polish judgments proved to be true in view of the further course of 
events. In June 2004, the French Minister of Finance caused a lot of controversy 
by arguing that “France had to distance itself from an ‘exclusive’ dialogue with 
Germany and work with other large member countries, namely the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Poland.”218 In June, the same year, Edmund Stoiber, 
the leader of Germany’s Christian Social Union (CSU), expressed a similar 
view.219 
The reason why successive Polish governments took a cautious approach 
to CFSP was that before 2004, they did not see particular benefits for Poland in 
Polish support for EU’s common positions towards Poland’s eastern neighbors 
(i.e. Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia).220 This approach, however, has changed, 
owing to what was seen as an active support from the EU on the side of Polish 
politicians in solving the Ukraine’s presidential crisis in 2004.221 
Since 2004, Poland has been taking an active part in many CFSP/ESDP 
initiatives. In 2004 Poland, together with Germany, committed itself to taking an 
active role in the formation by 2009 of an international battle group consisting of 
personnel from Latvia, Slovakia and Lithuania.222 Simultaneously, Poland will be 
a group coordinator and contribute the largest force.223 In December 2004, the 
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EU took over the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Poland has 
been actively contributing to this enterprise (currently with 170 to 220 
soldiers224). Moreover, on 27 April 2006, contributing to “the EUFOR RD Congo” 
mission, Poland sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo a military police (MP) 
contingent consisting of 131 MP personnel. 225 This region has never been an 
area of Polish interest. Such Polish involvement proves that Poland takes the 
issue of CFSP/ESDP seriously. Presently, a contingent of 400 Polish troops is 
ready to be deployed to Chad and the Central African Republic within the EU 
operation “EUFOR Tchad/RCA.”226 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
As presented above, the Polish stance on the CFSP/ESDP has 
undergone a kind of revolution during the last 16 years. It can be said that Poland 
changed its attitude towards the CFSP/ESDP because the Polish national 
interest demanded it. Poland took part in most CFSP/ESDP initiatives because it 
wanted to pacify the EU member states and show them that Poland, although the 
closest ally of the United States, was still looking for the solutions which would be 
the best for Poland and Europe. The author of this thesis believes that the U.S. is 
and will be Poland’s closest ally and a guarantor of its security. But Poland is a 
European state and requires good relations with Europe. 
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The post-Communist Polish foreign policy has been dominated by the 
need to balance Polish interest in good bilateral relations with the U.S., and its 
interest in being part of an increasingly integrated European community. 
In 2003, when the transatlantic rift about Iraq emerged, Poland as a future 
member of the European Union was forced to choose between the United States 
and Europe. In a face of a difference of opinion between the U.S. and the 
Franco-German tandem over Iraq, Poland supported America in Iraq and all the 
same proved that it put good relations with the U.S. first, even before relations 
with Poland’s European allies. Supporting the U.S. in war the Polish decision-
makers sacrificed Poland’s good relations with Europe for the special relations 
with the U.S. and expected the political and economic benefits from Poland’s 
involvement in Iraq. The decision to send Polish troops to Iraq significantly 
strengthened the Polish-American relationship. However, the lack of tangible 
benefits for Poland has subsequently cast a shadow over that relationship. It 
cannot be said that Poland attained no benefits, but these benefits were political 
and military, rather than economic in nature. Thanks to its involvement in Iraq, 
Poland enhanced its prestige in the international arena. Moreover, the 
intervention in Iraq was a good opportunity for the Polish troops to gain 
invaluable experiences.  
From the very beginning, Poland supported Washington’s ballistic missile 
defense program. In this matter, as in its subsequent support of the U.S. in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Polish State wanted to prove its loyalty toward the 
United States of America and underline Poland’s political Atlanticism. Russia and 
the other European-NATO members were on the other side of this issue, as 
would be expected. 
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In 2006, when Poland was invited by the U.S. to take part in bilateral 
consultations about deploying some elements of the American anti-missile shield 
on Polish soil, Russia and the other NATO capitals again voiced their criticism. 
Nevertheless, Poland decided to take part in negotiations about the U.S. 
proposal and all the same again proved its loyalty toward the U.S. Among 
European NATO members, it is generally believed that direct talks with Poland 
were intended by the United States to marginalize the Atlantic Alliance. In the 
ensuing controversy, the U.S. officials tried to reassure its European NATO 
partners. By means of intimidation, Russia wants to force Poland to withdraw 
immediately from negotiations on the U.S. proposal. Poland’s stance on this 
issue, however, stays constant. However, Donald Tusk’s government, which took 
over in Poland after the parliamentary elections of 2007, wants some tangible 
benefits for Poland from its involvement in this project. 
For Poland, the best solution would be to “bolt” together the U.S. 
antimissile shield (including 10 U.S. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Poland, 
and a radar installation in the Czech Republic) with the NATO Active Layered 
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD). This solution is probable, taking into 
account the fact that NATO decided to assess the full implications of the U.S. 
system by March 2008. It would allow Poland to avoid being perceived as an 
“American Trojan Horse” among the NATO allies. Nevertheless, Russia will still 
try to intimidate Poland. As the negotiations move closer to the final “deal” 
between the U.S. and Poland, stronger reservations may be expressed by 
Russia. 
Initially, the Polish and American stands on the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
were skeptical and lacking in enthusiasm. Polish and the U.S.’s decision-makers 
viewed the CFSP/ESDP as a policy competing with NATO and the U.S.A. 
However, since 2003, the Polish attitude towards CFSP and ESDP has gradually 
begun to change. This change of the Polish attitude towards CFSP and ESDP 
was not negatively recognized by Bush’s administration because, for its own 
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sake, it is good to have a close ally (Poland) involved in the CFSP/ESDP 
initiatives that would hinder the dictatorial inclinations of the Franco-German 
tandem. The Polish stance on the CFSP/ESDP has undergone a kind of 
revolution during the last 16 years. It can be said that Poland changed its attitude 
towards the CFSP/ESDP because the Polish national interest demanded it. 
Poland took part in most CFSP/ESDP initiatives because it wanted to pacify the 
EU member states and show them that Poland, although the closest ally of the 
United States, was still looking for the solutions which would be the best for 
Poland and Europe. 
B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Within the last seven years, Poland proved its loyalty several times 
towards the United States. In some moments of this period, the U.S. did not 
seem to see Poland’s sacrifices. However, Poland should continue to be heading 
the path with the U.S. as a leader of NATO and not attach great significance to 
“incidents” like Iraq. Unlike the U.S., Poland is neither a military nor economic 
power and needs an ally which would support it should the need arise. 
Simultaneously, Poland is a European state and requires good relations 
with Europe. As a member of the EU, Poland should take part in its CFSP/ESDP 
initiatives, but on the condition that they will not be competitive with NATO and 
the U.S.A. The EU is not and will not be a military alliance, so it will not be able to 
provide Poland with the safety guarantees. The author of this thesis believes that 
the U.S. is and will be Poland’s closest ally and a guarantor of its security. 
However, it must be emphasized that Polish-American relationships should be 
based to some degree on partnership and not based on serfdom. 
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